The Manipur crisis as a simultaneous breakdown of vertical trust between citizens and the state, and horizontal trust among communities. Using conflict theory, it argues that structural inequalities, identity fears, security dilemmas, and cultural violence have transformed the crisis into a self-sustaining cycle of mutual insecurity. Lasting peace requires rebuilding institutional legitimacy and intergroup trust, not merely restoring law and order.
By Sheikh Abdul Hakim
The Manipur crisis can be theorised as a breakdown of social cohesion at two levels: the vertical level, between citizens and the state, and the horizontal level, among communities. Social-cohesion theory defines the horizontal dimension as trust among people and groups, while the vertical dimension concerns trust between citizens and institutions such as the government. In Manipur, both have weakened at the same time, making the crisis far deeper than a normal law-and-order problem.
Core thesis
From the perspective of conflict theory, Manipur is not merely a clash of communities. It is a conflict over security, land, recognition, political power, identity, dignity, and trust. The immediate violence began in May 2023 around ethnic tensions linked to Scheduled Tribe status, affirmative-action benefits, land and political anxieties; by 2026, Reuters reported around 260 deaths and more than 60,000 displaced, while ACLED described the two major communities as living in near-complete segregation after two years of violence.
The central problem is this: each community now sees its own survival as insecure, and many citizens no longer believe that institutions can protect them with neutrality, speed, and fairness. Once that happens, every incident is interpreted not as an individual crime, but as evidence of collective danger.
1. Structural conflict: unequal power, land, representation and resources
Classical conflict theory begins from the idea that society is not always harmonious; it is often shaped by struggles over scarce resources and institutional power. In Manipur, the relevant resources are not only money or jobs. They include land, constitutional protection, political representation, administrative control, access to security, development, mobility, and cultural recognition.
Frances Stewart’s theory of horizontal inequalities is especially useful. It argues that conflict becomes more likely when economic, political, social and cultural inequalities are experienced not merely by individuals, but by identity groups. Stewart’s framework defines horizontal inequalities as inequalities among groups sharing a common identity, and notes that when cultural differences overlap with economic and political differences, resentment can deepen into violent struggle.
Applied to Manipur, the hill-valley divide becomes more than geography. The valley is associated with demographic concentration, political centrality and administrative visibility; the hills are associated with land protection, tribal autonomy, distance from state services and fear of domination. The Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status, and the opposition to it from Kuki-Zo and other tribal groups, therefore, became a symbolic struggle over who will control the future rules of land, reservation, recognition and security. That is why the conflict cannot be reduced to one incident alone.
2. Identity conflict: when grievance becomes community consciousness
Social Identity Theory, developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner, helps explain how people begin to see events through the lens of “us” and “them.” Their work showed that even minimal group distinctions can generate in-group preference and out-group suspicion; in a violent setting, this tendency becomes far more dangerous.
In Manipur, the crisis has turned identity into a security boundary. A killing, arrest, rumour, checkpoint, relief measure or government statement is no longer judged only on facts. It is often judged through the question: “Is this against my community or in favour of the other?” This is the psychological moment where horizontal mistrust becomes self-reinforcing.
The tragedy is that people who once shared markets, schools, roads, workplaces and friendships can begin to see one another as representatives of collective threat. At that stage, individual guilt disappears behind collective suspicion. Conflict theory calls this the hardening of group boundaries.
3. Security dilemma: every group’s self-defence frightens the other
The ethnic security dilemma is one of the most powerful explanations for Manipur today. Lake and Rothchild argue that intense ethnic conflict is not caused simply by “ancient hatred”; it is often produced by collective fear of the future, especially when groups doubt whether the state can credibly protect them. When the state’s authority weakens or is seen as biased, communities begin preparing for their own defence; those preparations then look threatening to the other side, causing a spiral.
This is visible in Manipur’s armed village-defence atmosphere, buffer zones, checkpoints, displacement camps, segregated settlements, and fear of crossing into the “other” area. Reuters reported that weapons were in circulation, including arms stolen from police or smuggled from Myanmar, while many Kukis and Meiteis moved out of mixed areas.
The security dilemma works like this:
One side says: “We are arming or blocking roads only to protect ourselves.”
The other side hears: “They are preparing to attack us.”
The state intervenes: one group sees protection, another sees bias.
Result: fear grows even when both sides claim they want safety.
Thus, Manipur’s crisis has moved from grievance to fear, and from fear to separation.
4. Vertical mistrust: the crisis of state legitimacy
Conflict theory also asks: who controls institutions, and do people see those institutions as neutral? In Manipur, vertical mistrust has become central. Many citizens no longer evaluate the state only by laws written on paper; they evaluate it by lived experience: Who came when we were attacked? Whose FIR was registered? Whose dead were honoured? Whose displaced families were heard? Whose roads were opened? Whose suffering was ignored?
The Supreme Court’s intervention itself shows the gravity of the institutional-trust problem. In its [Manipur violence order], the Court stressed the need to restore faith and confidence in the justice system, ensure that perpetrators are punished according to law, and sustain public confidence in investigation and prosecution. It also constituted a three-judge committee led by Justice Gita Mittal for relief, rehabilitation and survivor support, and appointed an outside police officer to supervise investigations.
This matters theoretically because when citizens lose confidence in institutions, they seek security from community organisations, armed volunteers, pressure groups, ethnic councils, rumour networks and local defence structures. The state then loses its monopoly over trust, even if it still has formal authority.
In simple terms: a government may control territory, but it cannot produce peace unless people believe it is fair.
5. Cultural violence: when language makes violence acceptable
Johan Galtung’s theory divides violence into direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence. Direct violence is visible: killings, arson, sexual violence, displacement, attacks. Structural violence is built into unequal systems. Cultural violence is the language, symbols, stereotypes and narratives that make direct or structural violence appear acceptable.
In Manipur, cultural violence appears when entire communities are reduced to labels: “illegal,” “terrorist,” “drug-linked,” “land-grabber,” “anti-national,” “aggressor,” or “enemy.” Once such language spreads, the crime of an individual is transferred onto a whole community. This is how collective blame is manufactured.
The theoretical danger is that cultural violence does not always look like violence. It may look like a slogan, a speech, a rumour, a meme, a funeral speech, a protest placard, or a social-media post. But it prepares the mind to accept cruelty.
6. Conflict entrepreneurs: those who benefit from division
Conflict theory also pays attention to actors who gain from instability. These may include extremist groups, armed networks, political hardliners, black-market actors, rumour-spreaders, and leaders who gain influence by presenting themselves as sole protectors of a community.
Lake and Rothchild note that [ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs] can build upon insecurity and polarise society. In Manipur, this means the conflict is not sustained only by spontaneous anger. It is also sustained by networks that turn fear into mobilisation, mobilisation into power, and power into bargaining strength.
This is why peace is difficult: for ordinary people, peace means returning home; for conflict entrepreneurs, peace may mean losing relevance.
7. Displacement and segregation: mistrust becomes geography
Displacement changes conflict from an event into a living structure. Once people are separated into camps, protected zones and community-specific territories, mistrust becomes geographical. ACLED’s description of near-complete segregation is therefore not only a demographic fact; it is a conflict-theory warning. Separation reduces everyday contact, and reduced contact allows rumours to replace relationships.
Intergroup Contact Theory, associated with Gordon Allport and later work by Pettigrew, suggests that contact reduces prejudice best when there is equal status, common goals, cooperation and authority support. But unsafe, unequal or forced contact can deepen fear. Therefore, simply telling communities to “live together again” is not enough. They need conditions where coexistence is safe, dignified and institutionally protected.
The Manipur crisis in one theoretical formula
Structural insecurity + identity fear + weak institutional trust + armed separation + hostile narratives = prolonged ethnic conflict.
Or more simply:
Vertical mistrust makes people doubt the state. Horizontal mistrust makes people fear neighbours. Together, they create a society where every action is suspected, every rumour travels fast, and every tragedy can become another trigger.
What conflict theory teaches for Manipur
The first lesson is that policing alone cannot solve a conflict that has become structural and psychological. Security is necessary, but security without trust can be read as occupation, bias or threat.
The second lesson is that justice must be both real and visible. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on restoring public confidence in investigation and prosecution is crucial because, in a mistrust society, justice hidden from public confidence will not heal public wounds.
The third lesson is that peace must operate at three levels: stop direct violence, correct structural grievances, and defeat cultural hatred. Galtung’s framework makes clear that removing guns is only the beginning; societies must also remove the narratives and inequalities that make violence return.
Final theoretical framing
Manipur today is best understood as a crisis of mutual insecurity. The Meitei fear loss of identity, land security, demographic balance and historical centrality. The Kuki-Zo fear loss of land, autonomy, physical safety and equal protection. Other communities fear being dragged into a binary conflict that may erase their own concerns. The government faces a legitimacy deficit because different communities judge its actions through different wounds. Therefore, the problem is not only that communities disagree. The deeper problem is that they no longer trust the same facts, the same institutions, or the same future.
The crisis began with events. It now survives through structures. It will end only when Manipur rebuilds both: vertical trust in the state and horizontal trust among communities.
(Sheikh Abdul Hakim is Director, Social Welfare, Government of Manipur)
The post Manipur Crisis Through Conflict Theory: A Two-Level Mistrust Model first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.
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