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Criticizing Regional Party Politics among Youths in Manipur: Is it a Case of What Lenin calls Infantile Disorder?

Criticism and intellectual debate are essential components of any democratic society, yet criticism alone cannot become a substitute for action. By Yaiphaba Khumanthem In the past few days, some scholars in Manipur have been circulating articles that appear […]

The post Criticizing Regional Party Politics among Youths in Manipur: Is it a Case of What Lenin calls Infantile Disorder? first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

Criticism and intellectual debate are essential components of any democratic society, yet criticism alone cannot become a substitute for action.

By Yaiphaba Khumanthem

In the past few days, some scholars in Manipur have been circulating articles that appear to project themselves as the sole saviors of the masses and the only ones capable of making a critical analysis of the issues and challenges facing the state. However, their writings often reflect an “all-knowing attitude” and a certain intellectual stubbornness.

These scholars frequently fail to acknowledge any argument that does not align with their own line of thought. For them, those who disagree are labeled opportunists, while those who attempt to explore alternative ways of addressing the problems are dismissed as irrational, power-hungry elites attempting to mislead the masses and the youth.

In recent months, the debate around the emergence of a strong regional political force capable of carrying the voice of the people has resurfaced. This revival is largely due to two important reasons: first, the perceived inability of political leadership of the state to act independently of central leadership; and second, the growing need to expand political space within the federal structure of the Indian state.

In this context, academia, activists, and retired bureaucrats have come forward to initiate a discussion on the need for a strong regional party that can properly represent the people of the state. This marks the first time since the 1970s that such groups have collectively reignited an academic and political debate on regionalism in this manner.

These same scholars, however, often critique this development by arguing that academia, activists, and retired bureaucrats represent an elite section of a particular community attempting to revive regional or electoral politics despite its repeated failures, ultimately seeking formal political influence. Another argument they advance is that this group lacks popular support and that there is no genuine mass demand for a regional party. While this may appear reasonable on the surface, it often lacks deeper understanding of the prevailing situation in Manipur.

Firstly, it is widely understood that it is politically risky, even politically suicidal, to openly oppose the ruling establishment at the centre, and its proxies in the state, in the present context, where dominant political forces are perceived to suppress dissenting voices. Secondly, the concern of these individuals who are now engaged in regional politics is not merely academic debate but also to engage and respond to the existing political structure in a more direct and meaningful way.

Moreover, even in a scenario where a regional party comes to power, critics argue that such groups would not necessarily gain political spoils or economic benefits, as seen in other states governed by regional parties. In order to participate in formal politics, it is often suggested that one must either align with the ideology of the ruling national party or negotiate within its framework. So, there is nothing much one can gain by advancing regional party politics. Hence, it will be wrong to say that an elite section of Manipur will amass significant political power through regional party politics in the state even if their party comes to power magically. Even if they do so, will it not be tactically useful for the larger struggle for the identity and future of the state? In this context, one must understand that nuances of the strategy and tactics involved in the struggle of Manipur.

In their enthusiasm to present themselves as the conscious voice of the working class, these scholars often fail to seriously examine why regional political parties have historically failed. They provide multiple explanations, but often overlook the structural pressures exerted by the central leadership of the national parties, particularly during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when regional parties were significantly constrained. The situation, however, has changed considerably in the post-2000 era, marking a new political phase.

Another argument they make is that this group lacks public support and that there is no mass demand for a regional party. This claim also appears to be superficial, as it does not adequately engage with the ground realities or the subjective and objective conditions that have emerged in recent months.

While they do advise youth engaged in electoral politics to understand that electoral participation is not the ultimate goal, this criticism remains incomplete without offering any viable alternative. For many years, such scholars have focused primarily on dissecting problems and movements without presenting concrete solutions. Their analyses of social and political movements may be insightful, but they often avoid the fundamental question: what is the actual outcome of these movements, and have they truly benefited the masses? If not, and if the problem is structural in nature, then why is there no attempt to explore alternative approaches to address it? No one is suggesting a compromise of core principles—especially the welfare of the masses—but there is a need for constructive direction.

Instead of doing nothing, something must be done. Endless theoretical debates, without practical engagement, cannot be a solution. Whether any experiment succeeds or fails depends on the effort and energy invested. However, continuously discussing problems without attempting to address them risks creating a sense of intellectual stagnation.

Scholars and academics must also acknowledge that we are no longer in the Cold War era, and the world has moved on. If the entire argument rests on the claim that problems are purely structural and therefore have no solutions, then it ceases to be a meaningful debate. Every problem must, in principle, have a potential solution. Within Marxist thought as well, Antonio Gramsci supports the idea of engaging with parliamentary processes as a means of capturing power, unlike certain other Marxist traditions.

The question before Manipur today is not whether every proposed solution is perfect, but whether society is willing to engage in meaningful efforts to address its challenges. Criticism and intellectual debate are essential components of any democratic society, yet criticism alone cannot become a substitute for action. If individuals, academics, activists, and concerned citizens are attempting to explore new political possibilities through democratic means, their efforts should be evaluated on the basis of their outcomes and intentions rather than dismissed outright. Political experiments may succeed or fail, but the willingness to engage with the realities of the people remains a necessary step toward change.

Ultimately, the responsibility of scholars is not only to identify contradictions and expose structural limitations but also to contribute constructively to the search for solutions. The masses do not benefit from endless theoretical disputes detached from practical realities. As circumstances evolve, political strategies must also adapt to changing conditions. The future of Manipur will depend not on who can offer the sharpest critique, but on who can bridge ideas with action and transform public aspirations into meaningful political and social progress. Lastly, these scholars remind us of the phrase ‘infantile disorder,’ a childishness of thought and practice, which Lenin uses to describe young scholars who refuses to grow up to understand that we do not need to oppose parliamentary politics every time.

(Yaiphaba Khumanthem is a PhD Scholar at DMU, Manipur)

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Unfolding Crisis Hits Naga Political Movement: The Eastern Flank Story

A faction of Naga leaders appears to have hardened its stance on the ‘struggle’ for the Naga political movement while maintaining its resolve on the Naga-Kuki issue. TFM Report On June 16, 2026, a document emerged from the Northeastern hills that would send shockwaves through the corridors of power in both New Delhi and the […]

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A faction of Naga leaders appears to have hardened its stance on the ‘struggle’ for the Naga political movement while maintaining its resolve on the Naga-Kuki issue.

TFM Report

On June 16, 2026, a document emerged from the Northeastern hills that would send shockwaves through the corridors of power in both New Delhi and the Naga armed resistance strongholds. The “Eastern Flank Statement” was not merely another political communiqué—it was a declaration of well-articulated tirade against what its leaders saw as the surrender of their hard-won principles.

The statement, purportedly issued by Hs. Ramsan, A. Raman, Ikato I. Chishi Swu (Executive Member, Steering Committee), Victor Angami (Member of Collective Leadership) and Angyo Jacob Tangshang, began with a tone of weary defiance: “We have, time and again, written letters and issued clarifications to the government, the party, and the Naga public at large. We have always kept the door open for reconciliation and unity.” But the door, they made clear, had been slammed shut by forces they could no longer ignore.

The signatories traced their lineage back to the very foundations of “Naga nationalism”—to “the submission of a memorandum to the Simon Commission on 10th January, 1929 by the Naga Club, demanding that the Nagas be left alone to decide their own future.” This was not a casual reaction; it was the latest chapter in a struggle that had defined their people for nearly a century.

Alleged Betrayal of the Framework Agreement

At the heart of the conflict stood the Framework Agreement (FA) signed on August 3, 2015—a document that had once promised hope for the future of the Nagas. Under the leadership of late Chairman Isak Chishi Swu and General Secretary Th. Muivah, the agreement had represented the culmination of decades of struggle.

But hope, the Eastern Flank argued, had curdled into compromise. “Since the signing of the FA, the GoI has effectively backtracked and betrayed the Agreement,” the statement declared with bitter finality. The “betrayal became concrete” when, in August 2019, the Government of India delivered a three-month ultimatum: abandon demands for a separate flag and constitution, or face the end of all negotiations, says the statement.

The Eastern Flank saw this as a moment of reckoning. Rather than capitulate, they moved to strengthen their military position. On September 3, 2019, a new Standard of Operation created the Eastern Flank itself—a strategic move to “establish our base in the East across the present artificial Indo-Myanmar border.” But what followed would fracture the Naga movement from within.

Brothers Turned Enemies

Just one month after the Eastern Flank’s creation, the unity of the “Naga Army” shattered. The then Longvibu, Anthony Ningkhan Shimray, supposedly issued an order that superseded the new arrangements, effectively “dismantling the strengthening of the Naga Army, the backbone of the Naga political movement”, claims the statement.

The Eastern Flank described a nightmare of internal betrayal. They recounted how Anthony Ningkhan Shimray “sent the then Brig. Alen Siro to Homalin to surround and annihilate us in coordination with our adversaries.” For more than forty days, they kept Brigadier Siro with them, “trying our best to reason with him against such treacherous activity and refraining from shedding the blood of our own Naga brothers.”

He refused to listen. When a Peace Mission Team visited Brigadier Sorei at Homalin Camp, he reportedly “openly stated that he was ordered by the then Longvibu and Brig. Alen Siro to shoot at the cadres of the Eastern Flank.” The bloodshed that would follow was, in their view, a foregone conclusion.

The Eastern Flank’s greatest grievance, however, was political rather than military. They detailed how a peace proposal drafted on December 7, 2019 had qualified the Naga national identity through deliberate euphemisms—”the government of India is not in a position to recognize it,” “respecting the will of the Naga people and prevailing sentiments.”

To the Eastern Flank, these were not words of compromise but of surrender. Hs. Ramsan and others wrote an urgent letter objecting to these formulations. Their stand forced a correction: “flag and constitution would be settled through political decision, without which there can be no honorable solution.”

But words, they discovered, were hollow. “Despite this official correction, the deeds of some of our authorities suggested otherwise.” The leadership continued its “meaningless talks for more than ten years after the signing of the FA”, says the Eastern Flank statement.

Terminations, Revocations, and Reinstatements

What followed was a systematic removal of those who dared to speak principle over pragmatism. The statement details a series of terminations, revocations, and reinstatements that read like a bureaucratic tragedy:

Hs. Ramsan was *”wrongly terminated on 12th July 2023 through false accusations” and later “given pardon at will”—only to be terminated again on July 18, 2024, this time “under false accusations of anti-national activities, branding them as anti-nationals”, says the statement.

The Eastern Flank claimed that those who had raised their voices against compromise were “systematically purged”. Meanwhile, those who had ordered attacks on fellow Naga cadres remained in power, says the statement.

The Eastern Flank’s response was defiant: “Rejecting this injustice, the national workers and senior officers of the Naga Army in the East resolved on 10th August 2024 to remain under the leadership of Lieut. Gen. Retd. Hs. Ramsan-VC.”

A New Coalition of Resistance

By March 2026, the Eastern Flank had found unexpected allies. “Mr. Ikato I. Chishi Swu, Executive Member Steering Committee and Mr. Victor Angami, Member of Collective Leadership and their entourage have taken the right decision to join hands with us to save the nation from another surrender,” claimed the statement.

The alliance was born not of ambition but of shared outrage. Both sides had watched helplessly as the Hebron leadership allegedly “failed to take concrete steps to save the nation” and continued negotiations that had become “meaningless, endless talks with the GoI.”

The Hongbei Massacre: Brotherhood Betrayed

Then came the trigger—the event that, for the Eastern Flank, proved beyond doubt that the Hebron leadership had allegedly become an instrument of their “adversaries”.

On March 28, 2026, four Naga cadres were killed at Hongbei Village, “even while a Peace Mission was still in process.” The dead were not enemies. They were brothers, says the statement. “At the time when the GoI is using the Kukis as a proxy to wage war against us to suppress the Naga political issue, and to create a Kuki Homeland within Nagalim,” the statement explains, “our cadres were sent to work in unison with the cadres of Ghq/Hebron.”

The Eastern Flank’s cadres met their counterparts stationed at Hongbei. They talked. They agreed on uniting against their common enemy. They exchanged pleasantries. And then some authorities chose betrayal, asserted the Eastern Flank. “They directed the cadres to shoot one’s own brother,” the statement reads. Two cadres survived “through divine intervention,” exposing “the secret evil intentions, and plans of some of the authorities of the Hebron/Ghq.”

The massacre was not just murder—it was proof, says the Eastern Flank. “Killing the force that stands for the Nagas is a clear indication of a force working in alignment with the policy of our adversaries.”

Response of the CSOs; Naga-Kuki Issue

In response, the Tangkhul Naga Long and other civil society organisations issued a non-cooperation directive against the Wung-Tangkhul Region, demanding justice. The Eastern Flank fully supported this: “Any attempt to revoke the non-cooperation against the WTR (NSCN/GPRN) before justice is served will be an abatement to create bigger problems among us.”

Their stance on the Kuki issue remained absolute: “There can be no peace and no compromise if the Kukis insist on creating a Kuki Homeland within Nagalim.”

The Eastern Flank’s disagreement with the Hebron leadership, they insisted, was not personal but principled. They pointed to specific clauses in the proposed competencies that represented, in their view, a betrayal of the Framework Agreement:

-“Competency serial no. 4(c) states that Nagas will send Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha members to the Parliament of India.”

-“The Naga Constitution/Yeahzabo is to be inserted in the Constitution of India as a separate chapter.”

– “The Election Commission of the Tatar Hoho shall function in conjunction with the Election Commission of India.”

– “The oath of office of Midan Kilonser and all Kilonsers of the NRTC shall be administered by the Governor of the State concerned.”

These provisions, the Eastern Flank argued, did not represent an honourable solution but a “surrender dressed in diplomatic clothing”. “After more than 70 years of struggle and the sacrifice of thousands of lives for our beloved Nagalim, can we now compromise our right to sovereign existence as a nation on account of the difficulties and position of the GoI?” they demanded.

A Rallying Cry

The statement concludes with a rallying cry—not just to armed cadres and politicians, but to all Nagas: “We appeal to all Nagas and national workers to rise up for the God-given rights of the Nagas. God Almighty is using the Nagas to build up according to His divine purpose. Therefore, let us abandon the spirit of doubt and timidity. Woe to those who doubt the faithfulness of God,” said the Eastern Flank. And with the traditional battle cry that has echoed through Naga history—”Kuknalim!”—the Eastern Flank made their position unmistakably clear.

As June 2026 draws to a close, the Naga movement stands at a crossroads. The Eastern Flank has drawn a line in the sand, invoking the spirit of the 1929 memorandum, the 1947 declaration of independence, and the 1951 plebiscite. They have rejected what they see as compromise and embraced what they believe to be principle.

Whether the Hebron leadership can bridge this chasm remains uncertain. The Government of India watches, waiting. The Naga-Kuki issue smolders. And Naga wait to see which path they will take.

One thing is clear: the struggle for “Nagalim” is far from over. And the Eastern Flank has made it known that, in their view, any solution that falls short of the Framework Agreement’s principles is no solution at all.

“We will stand our ground to seek an honourable and acceptable solution based on the principle of the FA that was signed under the leadership of our Chairman, late Mr. Isak Chishi Swu and General Secretary Mr. Th. Muivah.”

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The Headmaster’s Room, The CCA Hall, The Boys’ Toilet: A Decade of Alleged Abuse at KV No. 1 Lamphelpat

“He Said He Loved Me Like a Son”: Former KV Student Alleges Years of Sexual Abuse by Headmaster who has been granted bail in connection with a POCSO Case TFM Investigative Report A former student of Kendriya Vidyalaya No. 1, Lamphelpat, has come forward with allegations of repeated sexual abuse spanning several years, naming the […]

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“He Said He Loved Me Like a Son”: Former KV Student Alleges Years of Sexual Abuse by Headmaster who has been granted bail in connection with a POCSO Case

TFM Investigative Report

A former student of Kendriya Vidyalaya No. 1, Lamphelpat, has come forward with allegations of repeated sexual abuse spanning several years, naming the school’s headmaster, as the perpetrator. The revelation comes just days after a special POCSO court in Imphal West granted the headmaster interim anticipatory bail in connection with a related FIR.

The allegations detail a pattern of abuse that began when the survivor, now a young adult, was a student at the school between 2006 and 2016. The abuse reportedly occurred on multiple occasions during Class 6 (2012-13) and again in Class 9 (2014-15). The survivor, who has chosen to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the case, has provided a harrowing account of the trauma inflicted.

A Trust Betrayed

The survivor recalls first being drawn to the headmaster’s room as a child, describing how the headmaster would “play” with him. Vulnerable and seeking affection, the survivor explains that his real father was abusive and a drunkard. “At that time, I had already experienced similar things before and I thought it was ‘normal,’ especially when he said he loved me like his son, and that triggered a sense of wanting affection,” the survivor stated.

The abuse escalated to a sexual assault when the headmaster allegedly performed a sexual act on him. “I was shocked, confused, aroused, and taken away during the moment,” the survivor recounted. He was then coerced into reciprocating the act, which he did because, at the time, he believed it was “normal.”

The Encounter That Changed Everything

The survivor stopped seeing the headmaster for a while after his class shifted to a different area. However, a fateful encounter in 2014-15 at the school brought the abuse back. While waiting for a pickup after school hours, the headmaster allegedly took him to the CCA room. “I thought he was just going to play with me again, but he… asked me to do the same,” the survivor said.

A few days later, another incident occurred at the primary boys’ toilet. The survivor, who was deeply depressed and contemplating suicide, felt a confusing sense of exhilaration and sought the feeling again. “I wanted to feel it again, as I was deeply depressed during that period of time, with suicide on my mind,” he confessed.

The abuse then escalated further. “Upon him asking me repeatedly, I gave in. I didn’t know why I agreed, but he stopped when I said it hurts,” the survivor said. “Whatever experience I have narrated is true to the best of my knowledge and I would like to remain anonymous.”

The School and the Accused

The then headmaster at KV No. 1, Imphal: According to a provisional seniority list from Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, the headmaster holds a BA (Hons), MA, and B.Ed and joined the service on July 30, 2013 . He recently addressed the media during the school’s diamond jubilee celebration in December 2024, speaking of the institution’s commitment to societal betterment . He is also reportedly a member of a school committee that dealt with a 2025 altercation between Class XI and XII students .

Court Grants Interim Bail

An FIR was registered at Lamphel Police Station on June 9, 2026, under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, 2012, which deals with sexual assault and carries a maximum punishment of five years. In court, the headmaster’s counsel argued that he had been “falsely implicated” and that the allegations might be a “fallout” of the student incident from 2025 .

Granting him ad-interim bail on June 9, the court noted that “the apprehension felt by the petitioner has a reasonable basis.” He was released on a PR bond of Rs. 1,00,000 with conditions that he must cooperate with the investigation, not influence witnesses, and not leave the state without permission .

The court has called for a bail objection report from the Officer-in-Charge of Lamphel Police Station, returnable by Wednesday, June17, 2026, and has fixed the next hearing for that date.

Outrage and Questions

The allegations have sent shock-waves through the community, raising serious questions about the safety and well-being of children in one of Manipur’s premier educational institutions. The survivor’s detailed account, spanning years of abuse and manipulation, stands in stark contrast to the headmaster’s public persona as a leader dedicated to creating a “positive future” for his students.

This case also highlights the profound and often hidden struggle of child sexual abuse survivors who may not comprehend the nature of the abuse until years later, and whose vulnerability is often exploited by perpetrators in positions of trust. The next court hearing is expected to draw significant attention as the investigation unfolds.

The post The Headmaster’s Room, The CCA Hall, The Boys’ Toilet: A Decade of Alleged Abuse at KV No. 1 Lamphelpat first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

Vishwa Guru becomes Vishwa ‘Joker’, says PREPAK (Pro)

PREPAK (Progressive) accused local Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) of being New Delhi’s “proxy leaders,” alleging that after winning elections, they fail to hold meaningful discussions with local communities and prioritise attending religious rituals and public functions over governance. TFM Desk On the 16th Progressive Day of the proscribed PREPAK (Progressive) on June 1, […]

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TFM Desk

On the 16th Progressive Day of the proscribed PREPAK (Progressive) on June 1, its chairman, Longjam Paliba M, issued a strongly worded statement alleging that India has lost its credibility as a “Vishwa Guru” and has instead become a “Vishwa Joker.”

In the press release, the proscribed group accused India’s electoral system of being fundamentally flawed, claiming that elections in Manipur resemble an “auction market” where votes are effectively sold to the highest bidder. The statement further alleged that the Election Commission of India (ECI) and those who handle Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) “decide everything,” rendering voters powerless.

The organisation also accused local Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) of being New Delhi’s “proxy leaders,” alleging that after winning elections, they fail to hold meaningful discussions with local communities and prioritise attending religious rituals and public functions over governance. “People now felt that the emancipation from these India’s proxy leaders is initially necessary so as to decolonise from India,” the statement read.

PREPAK (Progressive) further alleged that Manipur’s natural resources and land — constituting 90% of the state — have been “wrongfully handed over to anti-Meitei communities” through what it called a “colonial” pre-planned law. The group also accused certain MLAs of being indifferent to violence, including the killing of two minors in Tronglaobi and the violence in Ukhrul and Kamjong districts, claiming that such incidents are “quickly forgotten after sipping a peg of liquor.”

In a highly charged section, the proscribed organisation alleged that New Delhi has refused to condemn Israel’s actions in Palestine, while also accusing the Kuki community — referred to derogatorily as “Narco-terrorists” and “the lost tribe of Israel” — of committing massacres against indigenous communities. The statement claimed that a US-Israel-led global hegemon is pursuing a “New World Order” through religious zeal, and alleged that India is following the ancient Mandala Game Theory of Chanakya, which it said would “ultimately wipe out Manipur”.

The press release concluded with a call for the youth to consolidate their energy to “save Eema leipak Manipur” and to recognise that New Delhi’s strategic aim is to end Meitei insurgency by purging the indigenous community.

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Biometric Betrayal: Rajasthan Man’s Fingerprints Don’t Match, Exposes Impersonation Racket in AIIMS Conducted Exam

“The act of procuring public employment through impersonation and fraudulent identity constitutes forgery for the purpose of cheating… and creation of unlawful entitlement to a government post,” the police report states. Investigators also suspect the involvement of an “organized network/racket,” given the nature of the impersonation in a national-level examination. TFM Report In a startling case […]

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TFM Report

In a startling case of examination fraud that has sent shockwaves through India’s premier medical recruitment system, a government employee at the Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), Imphal, has been arrested after official biometric verification revealed that the fingerprints and facial data of the person who took the entrance exam did not match his own.

Based on the police remand application filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal West, on May 11, 2026, the accused, identified as Jitendra Meena (30), a native of Karauli district in Rajasthan, was serving as a Multi-Tasking Staff (MTS) at RIMS, Imphal, based on his selection in the Common Recruitment Examination (CRE)-2024 conducted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), New Delhi.

However, an investigation by Lamphel Police Station has uncovered that Meena never actually appeared for the exam. Instead, an unknown impersonator sat for the test on his behalf, using fraudulent means to secure a government job.

Scientific Evidence Proves Impersonation

According to the official Biometric Verification Report issued by AIIMS and authenticated by agencies TCS and Innovatiview, neither Meena’s fingerprints nor his facial biometrics matched the data captured during the CRE-2024 examination.

“The certified biometric records clearly and unequivocally establish that both the fingerprint as well as facial biometric data of the accused do not match with the biometric data captured during the examination process,” states the police investigation report.

Investigators further noted that the facial appearance, physical structure, and identifiable features of the person who actually wrote the exam are “materially different” from those of the present accused.

Accused’s Explanation Dismissed as ‘Baseless’

During sustained interrogation, Meena allegedly claimed that the mismatch was due to a “finger skin problem” or possible “malfunctioning of biometric devices.” Police have dismissed this as an “untenable and misleading explanation,” noting that the exam was conducted under strict AIIMS supervision using scientifically validated systems.

Adding to the prosecution’s case, investigators revealed that when asked to read and translate simple alphabetic sentences and basic written content during custody, Meena “failed to do so satisfactorily” and could not demonstrate even the minimum comprehension expected of a candidate who qualified in a competitive national-level exam.

Charges: Cheating, Forgery, Conspiracy

Police have formally added charges under Sections 336, 338, 340, and 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 — covering cheating, forgery for the purpose of cheating, use of forged documents as genuine, and criminal conspiracy.

The investigation has revealed that Meena not only secured selection through impersonation but also used fraudulently obtained documents — including the application form, admit card, result notification, appointment order, and joining papers — as genuine to obtain a public post with pecuniary benefits.

Investigators also suspect the involvement of an “organized network/racket,” given the nature of the impersonation in a national-level examination.

Judicial Custody Sought

Police have requested 15 days of judicial custody for Meena (from May 11 to May 25, 2026) to complete ongoing investigations, including:

– Collection of original biometric records,
– Forensic comparison of biometric data,
– Examination of AIIMS/TCS/Innovatiview officials,
– Identification of the actual impersonator, and
– Unearthing the wider conspiracy.

The investigating officer, SI S. Chandrikishor Singh of Lamphel Police Station, submitted before the court that the accused has been “deliberately concealing material facts, furnishing false and unreasonable explanations, and attempting to obstruct the progress of investigation.”

The case remains under active investigation, with authorities now probing whether similar impersonations have occurred in other recruitment examinations conducted by AIIMS and other central institutions.

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Church Leaders Killed in Ambush; ZUF Denies Involvement

Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) has issued a press release denying any involvement in the ambush. United Naga Council (UNC) issued a strong condemnation of the attack and expressed concerns over reports that some Nagas from Konsakhul village had allegedly been held hostage by villagers from Leilon Vaiphei following the ambush. TFM Report A deadly ambush […]

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TFM Report

A deadly ambush targeting church leaders of the Thadou Baptist Association (TBA) has sent shockwaves across Manipur after several prominent Christian leaders were attacked between Kotzim and Kotlen villages in Kangpokpi district on Tuesday.

According to sources, the church leaders were returning to Kangpokpi from Churachandpur after attending a TBA conference when armed assailants allegedly ambushed their convoy midway. The victims were traveling in two vehicles at the time of the attack.

Among those killed in the ambush was Rev. V. Sitlhou, former General Secretary of the Manipur Baptist Convention (MBC), Pastor Paogoulen, and Pastor Kaigoulun. The killings have triggered widespread grief and outrage among many organisations.

As per sources, others who sustained injuries in the incident include Rev. S.M. Haopu, Rev. Hekai Simte, Rev. Paothang, Lelen (driver), and Goumang (driver). It is stated that some of the injured were rushed for medical treatment as authorities began assessing the scale of the attack.

The ambush has sparked fresh tensions in the already volatile hill districts of Manipur, where ethnic and armed conflicts have continued to destabilise normal life.

UNC Condemns “Outrageous Ambush”

The United Naga Council (UNC) issued a strong condemnation of the attack through an official press release dated May 13, 2026. The organization described the ambush as an “outrageous” act and stated that three persons had been killed while five others were grievously injured according to available reports.

The UNC specifically mentioned that the incident occurred between Kotzin and Kotlen while the church leaders were returning from Churachandpur. The council expressed deep condolences to the bereaved families and prayed for strength and peace during the period of mourning.

The statement also highlighted concerns over reports that around 20 Nagas from Konsakhul village had allegedly been held hostage by villagers from Leilon Vaiphei following the ambush. Calling such actions unacceptable, the UNC urged the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages and appealed to all communities, church leaders, and civil society organizations to work together to prevent further escalation of violence and restore communal harmony.

ZUF Denies Involvement

Meanwhile, the Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF) issued a press release denying any involvement in the ambush. The statement, released by the organization’s Ministry of Information and Publicity from its Dilung headquarters, said the group had learned of the attack “with deep shock and concern.”

The organization categorically rejected allegations circulating on social media and in certain public circles linking the ZUF to the incident. According to the statement, the allegations were “baseless, unfounded and misleading,” and the organization claimed it was neither aware of nor connected to the attack in any manner.

The ZUF further appealed to civil society groups and media organizations not to spread unverified information or make premature accusations without factual evidence, warning that misinformation could further inflame the already sensitive situation in the state.

Fear and Uncertainty Grip Region

The brutal nature of the ambush, reportedly targeting unarmed church leaders returning from a religious gathering, has generated fear and uncertainty across the hill region. Images circulating after the incident showed damaged vehicles and critically injured victims, underscoring the severity of the attack.

Security agencies are expected to launch a detailed investigation into the incident. However, no official statement had yet been issued by the state government or law enforcement authorities regarding the identity of the attackers or the exact casualty figures till the filing of this report.

The incident is likely to deepen concerns over the deteriorating security situation in the hill districts, where armed activity, ethnic distrust, and retaliatory violence continue to threaten civilian lives.

Church organizations, tribal bodies, and civil society groups are expected to hold emergency consultations in the coming days as calls grow louder for justice, accountability, and restoration of peace in the conflict-affected areas of Manipur.

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Linear Path of Terror: Architecture of Modern Terrorist Financing

Trends collectively suggest that TF risk is becoming more diffuse, networked and embedded in legitimate global flows, requiring intelligence?driven, multi?sectoral responses rather than reliance on static typology checklists. By Lt Col Ujjual Abhishek Jha, Retd Comprehending Terrorist Financing (TF) origins requires an analytical thinking beyond conventional Anti-Money Laundering (AML) framework. Money Laundering (ML) is circular […]

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By Lt Col Ujjual Abhishek Jha, Retd

Comprehending Terrorist Financing (TF) origins requires an analytical thinking beyond conventional Anti-Money Laundering (AML) framework. Money Laundering (ML) is circular process wherein illicitly acquired money is integrated back to legitimate economy. TF is a linear process wherein source of money can be legal or illegal and is aimed towards a violent action. This differentiation is very important in TF, as it makes detection of TF extremely difficult (no Red Flags, source legal or intent and end point not established). Terrorist financing (TF) are finances that enable terrorist activities. TF differs from typical money laundering in three important ways, origin of funds may be legitimate, amounts involved can be relatively small and primary objective is to ensure funds reach operatives. ?? ????? ?? ??????????? ?? ??????? ??? ??????????? ???? ???? ??????????? ?? ??????. Four stage frameworks of TF model are ??????????, ????, ???????? ??? ?????.

Four Stage Framework TF Model

Stage 1: Collection. The generation of capital from a diverse source (both legal and illegal/ criminal) to support organization’s expenditures or specific operations. Can be donations, criminal activity, business profits or state sponsored.
Stage 2: Hold. The aggregation and holding of funds until they are required for an operational need. This stage has the risk of seizure and needs to overcome the same. Can be in bank accounts, high-value commodities, pre-paid cards or un-hosted crypto-wallets.
Stage 3: Transfer. The transfer of value from the storage point to the end destination or user, often across international borders i.e. transfer of value from holding point to end destination or user. Formal banking, Informal Value Transfer System (Hawala), trade-based or virtual assets are few examples of the same. This stage is often said to be the point of highest risk for the financier as this can expose the organisation. However, the evolution of decentralised finance (DeFi) and peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies has increasingly allowed groups to mitigate these risks by bypassing centralized intermediaries.
Stage 4: Usage. The final expenditure of funds to facilitate attacks or maintain the organization’s long-term sustainability. Can be for weapon procurement, training, travel, media messaging or social services.

Typology of Sources of Terrorist Financing

TF: Legal & Semi-Legitimate Sources

A substantial portion of TF is resultant of legitimate economic activity, which presents a distinct challenge for financial institutions. If funds originate from a lawful activity and do not stain of criminal predicate, then it necessitates a shift from identifying dirty money to dirty intent. The means are discussed below.

Abuse of the Non-Profit Sector (NPOs) – NPOs and charities have been identified by the FATF as particularly vulnerable to abuse for terrorist financing. E.g. fund diversion of legitimate donations for humanitarian purposes are siphoned off by complicit staff or external actors.

Commercial Interests and Legitimate Businesses – Large terrorist organizations often act as venture capitalists, investing surplus capital into legitimate commercial sectors to ensure a steady stream of income, serving dual purpose, provide a clean revenue stream and offer cover for operatives stay and move.

Self-Finance and the Lone Wolf – The individual operatives have own legitimate income as the primary source of funding. It is often supplemented by micro-financing strategies like welfare and benefit fraud, small loans and personal savings & family donations.

TF: Illegal & Criminal Sources

Industries and Territorial Taxation – For groups that control territory, such as ISIS at its zenith, the primary source of revenue is the exploitation of natural resources and the taxation of the local population.

Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR) – Kidnapping for ransom has become a principal revenue generation source for groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and even in the case of ISIS provinces in West Africa, Khorasan, and South Africa.

Drug Trafficking – The intersection of drug trafficking and terrorism is one of the most known aspects of the crime-terror nexus. The reported Taliban’s dependance on the opium trade and Hezbollah’s said involvement in the cocaine trade from South America to Europe show exploitation of drug market by these groups to fund their political projects.

Fraud and Identity Theft – In Western countries terror cells involves in low level but high-volume frauds supporting terrorist financing methods.

Digital Landscape – Introduced new vulnerabilities into FT leading to increased abuse of digital platforms (virtual assets, crowdfunding and social media) to facilitate collection and transfer of funds with speed and anonymity.

Move Typology: Mechanics of Transfer

Post raising and storing of funds, movement of funds is required for operations/ sustenance. The terror outfits mostly employ hybrid method of fund transfer, formal, informal and trade-based systems to evade surveillance.

Formal Fund Transfer – In spite of exhaustive regulation, the formal banking sector remains a primary target for misuse, using individuals with clean backgrounds (straw men) for opening accounts and transactions. Usage of shell companies is also common method to mask the movement of funds. A common method in the formal sector is structuring or smurfing, where large sums is broken into small transactions to avoid trigger of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs).

Hawala and Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) – Hawala is an ancient system of value transfer that operates outside the conventional banking sector. It is based on a network of brokers (hawaladars) who facilitate transfers through trust and net settlement rather than the physical movement of money. The characteristics of Hawala as speed, lower costs and potential anonymity, makes it highly attractive for both legitimate remittances and illicit financing. Hawala settlement in often through Reverse Hawala or Bilateral Settlement, where hawaladars balance their accounts by paying for each other’s expenses in or through the invoicing of legitimate trade.

Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (TBML/TBTF) – TBML is defined as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions to legitimize their origins. It is one of the most complex methods of value transfer. Mechanisms of TBML include Over and Under-Invoicing, Phantom Shipments (documents generated for goods that are never shipped), Multiple Invoicing and Surrogate Shopping/ Daigou (high purchase of goods using illicit cash and collecting clean money from end-users). As per FATF, TBML is increasingly attractive and is frequently used by groups like Hezbollah and the Taliban, who have established deep connections with international trade and transport companies.

Digital Frontier & Emerging Technologies

The rapid evolution of financial technology has introduced new vulnerabilities into the FT landscape. Terrorists are increasingly misusing digital platforms including virtual assets, crowdfunding and social media, to generate and move funds with unprecedented speed and anonymity.

Virtual Assets (VAs) and Cryptocurrencies – Virtual assets are characterized by non-face-to-face relationships and can permit anonymous funding. While Bitcoin was the initial currency of choice, the transparency of its blockchain has led to a shift toward more privacy-centric and stable assets. The overall VA use in terrorist financing remains relatively lower than cash and Hawala, but its reportedly growing in South and Central Asia.

Crowdfunding and Social Media Integration – Social media platforms as Facebook and Twitter act as broadcast mechanisms to ask donations. Once a potential donor is identified, the conversation moves to private, often encrypted, as Telegram or WhatsApp. Crowdfunding platforms are misused through campaigns, disguising funds as humanitarian aid for conflict zones, using combination of traditional payment methods and new technologies (Crypto) to avoid detection.

Emerging Threats and AI Factor

FATF Update on TF Risks of 2024 and 2025 highlights surge in activity by young, tech-savvy actors who are radicalized online and employ micro-financing. FATF also warned specific AI risks of not only in the recruitment and radicalization but also in automation of fund operations.

Trends collectively suggest that TF risk is becoming more diffuse, networked and embedded in legitimate global flows, requiring intelligence?driven, multi?sectoral responses rather than reliance on static typology checklists. For corporate security and compliance functions, this means that the “financial footprint” of terrorism often appears as small, routine, sometimes even charitable or community?oriented transactions.

(Lt Col Ujjual Abhishek Jha, Retd is a Certified Data Privacy Professional and Strategic & Geopolitical Advisor with over two decades of experience in intelligence, insider threat management, financial crime investigations, and geopolitical risk analysis, advising on complex security and strategic risks.)

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CM Links Tronglaobi Killings to Elements Keen on Derailing Peace Efforts, Calls for Unity

Highlighting public sentiment, Yumnam Khemchand said people across communities have expressed a strong desire for peace and stability. He urged citizens to remain united and vigilant against elements seeking to create division. TFM Report Manipur Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh on Wednesday (April 29) said the April 7 Tronglaobi blast, which killed two children, was […]

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TFM Report

Manipur Chief Minister Yumnam Khemchand Singh on Wednesday (April 29) said the April 7 Tronglaobi blast, which killed two children, was likely the handiwork of groups attempting to destabilize the state and obstruct ongoing peace efforts.

Referring to the Tronglaobi incident in which two children (siblings) were killed, he said the government under him believe that the incident must have been triggered by “those who did not want the formation of a popular government or those who want to create a volatile atmosphere. We will apprehend those responsible, they have no place to run”.

Addressing a gathering in Langthabal constituency in Imphal West district after inaugurating five infrastructure projects, the Chief Minister placed the incident in context. He noted that Manipur had been under President’s Rule since February 13, 2025, following the resignation of former Chief Minister N Biren Singh amid prolonged ethnic violence that began on May 3, 2023. President’s Rule was revoked on February 4, 2026, paving the way for the formation of a new government led by Singh, due to demand of forming a popular government from the general public.

“After a consistent demand for the revocation of President’s Rule and installation of a popular government through the voices of the public, I became the Chief Minister (I did not lobby for the post nor did I know that I would be the one for the post),” said the Chief Minister.

On the occasion, Khemchand also emphasized that peace remains the foremost requirement for development. The projects included three water supply schemes and two community halls. He added that since assuming office, his focus has been on initiating a “journey for peace” aimed at rebuilding trust and harmony among communities.

Over the past two months and twenty days, Singh said he has engaged extensively with MLAs, officials, and civil society groups, while also visiting both hill and valley districts—including Jiribam, Senapati, Kangpokpi, and Ukhrul—to understand public grievances and promote reconciliation. He pointed out that the Tronglaobi blast occurred shortly after his visit to Jiribam, calling it an “unfortunate” attempt to derail the fragile peace process.

Highlighting public sentiment, Singh said people across communities have expressed a strong desire for peace and stability. He urged citizens to remain united and vigilant against elements seeking to create division.

Reaffirming the government’s commitment, Singh said development initiatives would continue across all regions, including remote areas, despite ongoing challenges, and called for collective cooperation to build a peaceful and progressive Manipur.

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CM Links Tronglaobi Killings to Elements Keen on Derailing Peace Efforts, Calls for Unity

The post CM Links Tronglaobi Killings to Elements Keen on Derailing Peace Efforts, Calls for Unity first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

TFM Report

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Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part IV –Implementation Recommendations

The enactment of the DPDPA 2023 and the DPDP Rules 2025 indicates the dawn of a new era for digital economy in India, where privacy is a fundamental operational requirement. However, the compliance path is steep, requiring a fundamental shift from reactive legal measures to a proactive “privacy-by-design” framework. By Lt Col Ujjual Abhishek Jha, […]

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By Lt Col Ujjual Abhishek Jha, Retd

For Part I – Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part I — The Foundations of Privacy: Evolution of Indian Laws & A Roadmap to DPDPA – The Frontier Manipur

For Part II – Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part II — From Principles to Practice: The DPDP Rules 2025, Global Paradigms & India’s Middle Path – The Frontier Manipur

For Part III – Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part III – Impact & Implementation Challenges – The Frontier Manipur

The entry of DPDPA, 2023, is more than a law. This is a fundamental shift in our life, work and interaction in the digital age. The law is pioneer in legal system, in drawing a clear line that personal data belongs to the people. This Act is a brave attempt to find the delicate balance between the right to privacy and the need for innovation in modern era. But a well-known fact remains that, there is often a gap between a law being passed and the reality of how it works on the ground and subsequent challenges faced by small businesses to corporate giants or law enforcement agency. This part brings out human-centred implementation strategy and explore how each player in the ecosystem can move beyond routine compliance and move towards building a culture where data privacy is treated as a core value.

Implementation Strategy: Cross?Cutting Recommendations

As organizations navigate the complexities of the DPDPA 2023 & DPDP Rules 2025, compliance should not be viewed as only a legal requirement but as a pillar of operational resilience. Across all segments, successful implementation will depend on four cross-cutting strategic pillars: –

Gap Assessment and Roadmap – First and foremost task is to identify technical and procedural vulnerabilities. Then utilize the 18-month window to identify and prioritize risks and address those by long-term infrastructure changes. Leveraging the statutory transition window needs to applied to cover the identified gaps using quantified roadmap.
Investment in Human Talent – Create own pool of internal talents and use expertise of external consultants to bridge the gap between legal framework and technical necessities. Qualified internal pool will act as intermediaries and needs to be supplemented by specialized external advisors to address complex regulatory nuances and technical implementation hurdles.
Governance Integration – The upliftment of privacy from back-office function to to a primary board-level priority for governance integration of board-level oversight. Also, accountability needs to be set using dedicated risk registers, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and periodic reporting.
Continuous Improvement – Dynamic alignment and regular recalibration of internal processes based on emerging guidance from the Data Protection Board of India (DPBI). Also, global benchmarking by evolving own strategies in line with shifting global best practices and evolving sectoral regulations to maintain a sustainable posture.

Recommendations

Individuals

Statutory rights under the DPDPA empower individuals to manage their digital identity use of rights to see, fix or delete own data and keep own records of the permissions or any complaints. To exercise these effectively, individuals should follow these protocols: –

Access Inquiry – Formally request a summary of personal data currently being processed and the identities of third parties with whom it has been shared.
Correction & Completion – Initiate requests to rectify inaccurate data or complete evolving datasets to ensure processing remains fair.
Erasure Mandate – Request the deletion of personal data once the specific purpose for collection has been exhausted or consent is withdrawn.
Audit Trail Maintenance – Keep independent logs of all consents granted, notices received, and grievances filed to facilitate swift resolution through the DPBI if necessary.

MSMEs

For MSMEs, the path to compliance begins with a pragmatic data inventory. The foundation for all privacy actions can be determined by: –

What – Classify the specific types of personal data collected.
Why – Define the specific legal purpose for processing.
Where – Plan the precise storage locations, whether in-premise, in the cloud or with third-party vendors.
Who – Identify all internal stakeholder and external partner with data access.

Data Inventory Steps

Map Data Ingress – Identify exact purpose of personal data collected from individuals.

Define Purpose – Clearly document the legal and operational for every data point.

Localize Storage – Precise data location both digital and physical.

Trace Data Egress: Document every third party with whom data is shared.

Compliance Tools Checklist

Standardize Policies – Adopt core privacy policies, data retention schedules and breach response SOPs.
Cloud-Native Services – Use managed services for consent management rather than internal solutions.
Standardized Notices – Implement simple language, standard notice and consent flows.
Security Defaults – Leverage cloud-based logging, encryption and access control features to meet security mandates.

Alert: Regulatory Risk – MSMEs face limited but obligations regarding consent, notices, security and breach notification. While SDF is unlikely for MSMEs, sector-wise or large-scale classification can impact Fintech, Healthtech, Edtech and high-volume SaaS providers.

Corporates

Large-scale entities must organize a sophisticated, integrated and deep defence strategy. The steps that corporate needs to undertake are: –

Establishment of Privacy Office – Appoint a Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) or Data Protection Officer (DPO) to lead a dedicated office integrated with CISO, Legal, Risk and Compliance verticals.
Active Record of Processing Activities (ROPA) – Build and maintain a live data inventory mapped to specific purposes, retention schedules and legal bases.
Implement Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) – Integrate DPIAs into the lifecycle of all high-risk initiatives to institutionalize privacy-by-design.
Upgrade Third-Party Risk Management: Incorporate DPDPA-specific clauses and contractual safeguards into all vendor agreements, mandated with regular audits and certifications.
Align with Global and Sectoral Regulators: Coordinate DPDPA requirements with existing frameworks (ISO, NIST) and sectoral mandates (RBI, IRDAI, TRAI) to remove redundant efforts and leverage shared controls.

Government and Law Enforcement

SOP and Accountability – Government departments must formalize Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for data access and sharing. These SOPs must be designed to endure judicial scrutiny and DPBI audits.
Proportionality Oversight – Internal mechanisms must ensure that data access is necessary, limited in scope and proportionate to the stated objective.
Automated Logging – Comprehensive, unalterable logs must be maintained for all data access events to ensure accountability.
Infrastructure and Training – Legacy IT systems must be modernized to meet DPDPA security standards. Simultaneously, specialized training programs are required for investigators and prosecutors. This training must focus on the lawful handling of digital evidence and the strict procedural requirements for processing personal data during investigations. This means to transform LEA and departmental IT infrastructure to withstand DPBI and judicial scrutiny

International Business & Organisations

Extraterritorial Compliance: The extraterritorial applicability of DPDPA is to entities outside India offering goods/ services to individuals in India, requiring them to comply with rules (including consent, notices, rights handling and DPBI enforcement). Foreign entities must strictly adhere to Indian mandates regarding consent, notices and rights handling to avoid DPBI enforcement actions.
Cross-Border Transfer Mechanics – While transfers are allowed by default, organizations must monitor the government-notified “negative list” of prohibited countries or sectors. However, these needs to be kept in mind: –
Critical Sector Restrictions: High-risk or highly regulated sectors may face additional localization requirements or localized storage mandates.
Contractual Updates – Global organizations must map Indian data flows separately and update global privacy notices and vendor contracts with India-specific clauses.
Global Control Baselines: Establish privacy as a common control baseline across the organization while applying specific Indian legal overlays to local data flows.
Strategic Mapping: Separate Indian data flows from global flows in internal mapping to allow for rapid response to localization or transfer restrictions.

The enactment of the DPDPA 2023 and the DPDP Rules 2025 indicates the dawn of a new era for digital economy in India, where privacy is a fundamental operational requirement. However, the compliance path is steep, requiring a fundamental shift from reactive legal measures to a proactive “privacy-by-design” framework. Ultimately, those who view privacy as a strategic asset rather than a regulatory hurdle will be best positioned to thrive in India’s maturing, trust-based data landscape. In the present era of screens and servers, awareness of handling of our personal information is preferred way for a digital society. The transition will take time and requires a massive shift in mindset. As we move forward, the companies and institutions that lead with transparency and empathy will be the ones that truly succeed in this new landscape.

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Can Manipur Govt issue advisory to digital media platforms under IT Rules, 2021? NO!

Based on the legal framework of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 and the specific precedent involving The Frontier Manipur in 2021, a state government cannot issue such an advisory to regulate digital news content under Part III of the IT Rules, 2021. TFM Analysis The Home Department […]

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TFM Analysis

The Home Department of the Government of Manipur issued an advisory on April 27, directing all electronic, digital, and social media platforms operating within the State to adhere to responsible dissemination of information.

Citing the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the advisory noted that instances of unverified, misleading, and provocative content — including announcements attributed to banned organisations — have been observed, causing panic and disturbance to public order.

The advisory mandates due diligence by platforms, prohibits hosting content from unlawful or unauthorised organisations, and calls for the prevention of misinformation, deepfakes, and manipulated content. News publishers have been directed to adhere to the Code of Ethics under the IT Rules, 2021, ensuring accuracy, fairness, and respect for public order.

Platforms have also been asked to refrain from sensational or provocative content, establish grievance redressal mechanisms, and cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Non-compliance, the advisory stated, may attract action under the Information Technology Act, 2000. The order, issued with the approval of the Competent Authority, came into immediate effect.

Not Again! Know the Centre’s mandate

Based on the legal framework of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 and the specific precedent involving The Frontier Manipur in 2021, a state government cannot issue such an advisory to regulate digital news content under Part III of the IT Rules, 2021.

A cursory legal analysis and the referenced precedent.

The Legal Basis: Part III is a Central Subject

The advisory you attached explicitly cites the IT Rules, 2021 as its source of authority (specifically clauses 3 and 4 of the document). However, the legal architecture of these rules divides power between the Centre and States:

– Part II of the IT Rules, 2021 deals with Intermediaries (social media platforms like Facebook, X, etc.). These rules are administered by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) .

– Part III of the IT Rules, 2021 deals with Publishers of Digital News and Current Affairs. These rules are administered exclusively by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB), Government of India.

The Central Government’s Clarification (2021)

To prevent overreach, the Central Government issued a formal clarification to all States and Union Territories on March 3, 2021. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting explicitly stated that:

“It is hereby informed that Part-III of the Rules are administered by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. These powers have not been delegated to State Governments/District Magistrates/Police Commissioners.”

Any action taken by a State Government under Part III (i.e., regulating digital news content, enforcing a “Code of Ethics,” or issuing directions to news publishers) is therefore legally untenable and ultra vires (beyond its legal authority).

The Precedent: Manipur vs. The Frontier Manipur (2021)

Your reference to the notice issued to The Frontier Manipur is the definitive precedent for why the advisory issued by Government of Manipur, Home Department is invalid.

– The Incident (March 1, 2021): The District Magistrate of Imphal West issued a notice to The Frontier Manipur (TFM) and its talk show “Khanasi Neinasi.” The notice demanded documents proving compliance with the IT Rules, 2021, citing the new digital media norms. This was the first time that a notice has been issued under the new guidelines that the Centre announced on February 25.

– The Central Intervention: The Central Government intervened immediately. I&B Secretary Amit Khare wrote a letter to the Manipur Chief Secretary stating that the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to issue such a notice.

– The Result: The Manipur Government was forced to withdraw the notice within 24 hours. The Deputy Commissioner pasted a new order outside The Frontier Manipur, Executive Editor’s residence stating the previous notice was “withdrawn with immediate effect”.

How the Current Advisory Exceeds State Powers

The advisory dated April 27, 2026 contains several provisions that violate the 2021 Central clarification:

Provision in Advisory	Legal Status	Reason
Point (v): Barring “sensational” or “provocative” content.	Ultra Vires	This is content regulation of news publishers, falling exclusively under MIB (Part III)
Point (vi): Mandating Grievance Redressal Mechanisms.	Ultra Vires	The 3-Tier grievance system for digital news is controlled by the Centre, not the State Home Department.
Point (vii): Threatening loss of “statutory protections” (Safe Harbour).	Ultra Vires	The power to strip an intermediary of safe harbor protection lies with the Centre under Section 79 of the IT Act, not a State Commissioner of Home.

The “Notice” vs. “Advisory” Distinction

While the government might argue that the attached document is merely an “Advisory” and not an “Order,” legally this distinction is weak (a distinction without a difference).

– The Effect: The document uses mandatory language (“shall be ensured,” “strict compliance,” “Legal Consequences for Non-Compliance”).

– The Precedent: In 2021, the Centre rebuked Manipur even for issuing a notice requesting information. The Centre maintains that no State authority—whether by notice, order, or advisory—can compel compliance under Part III of the IT Rules.

What is Wrong?

The Government of Manipur lacks the constitutional and statutory authority to issue this advisory under the IT Rules, 2021. Therefore, the advisory is legally unenforceable. It mirrors the exact overreach seen in The Frontier Manipur case of 2021, which the Central Government immediately quashed. If a media house receives such a notice, it can respond citing the MIB’s circular dated March 3, 2021, stating that the State Home Department has no jurisdiction over digital news content under Part III of the IT Rules, 2021.

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Manipur Crisis Through Conflict Theory: A Two-Level Mistrust Model

The Manipur crisis as a simultaneous breakdown of vertical trust between citizens and the state, and horizontal trust among communities. Using conflict theory, it argues that structural inequalities, identity fears, security dilemmas, and cultural violence have transformed the crisis into a self-sustaining cycle of mutual insecurity. Lasting peace requires rebuilding institutional legitimacy and intergroup trust, […]

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By Sheikh Abdul Hakim

The Manipur crisis can be theorised as a breakdown of social cohesion at two levels: the vertical level, between citizens and the state, and the horizontal level, among communities. Social-cohesion theory defines the horizontal dimension as trust among people and groups, while the vertical dimension concerns trust between citizens and institutions such as the government. In Manipur, both have weakened at the same time, making the crisis far deeper than a normal law-and-order problem.

Core thesis

From the perspective of conflict theory, Manipur is not merely a clash of communities. It is a conflict over security, land, recognition, political power, identity, dignity, and trust. The immediate violence began in May 2023 around ethnic tensions linked to Scheduled Tribe status, affirmative-action benefits, land and political anxieties; by 2026, Reuters reported around 260 deaths and more than 60,000 displaced, while ACLED described the two major communities as living in near-complete segregation after two years of violence.

The central problem is this: each community now sees its own survival as insecure, and many citizens no longer believe that institutions can protect them with neutrality, speed, and fairness. Once that happens, every incident is interpreted not as an individual crime, but as evidence of collective danger.

1. Structural conflict: unequal power, land, representation and resources

Classical conflict theory begins from the idea that society is not always harmonious; it is often shaped by struggles over scarce resources and institutional power. In Manipur, the relevant resources are not only money or jobs. They include land, constitutional protection, political representation, administrative control, access to security, development, mobility, and cultural recognition.

Frances Stewart’s theory of horizontal inequalities is especially useful. It argues that conflict becomes more likely when economic, political, social and cultural inequalities are experienced not merely by individuals, but by identity groups. Stewart’s framework defines horizontal inequalities as inequalities among groups sharing a common identity, and notes that when cultural differences overlap with economic and political differences, resentment can deepen into violent struggle.

Applied to Manipur, the hill-valley divide becomes more than geography. The valley is associated with demographic concentration, political centrality and administrative visibility; the hills are associated with land protection, tribal autonomy, distance from state services and fear of domination. The Meitei demand for Scheduled Tribe status, and the opposition to it from Kuki-Zo and other tribal groups, therefore, became a symbolic struggle over who will control the future rules of land, reservation, recognition and security. That is why the conflict cannot be reduced to one incident alone.

2. Identity conflict: when grievance becomes community consciousness

Social Identity Theory, developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner, helps explain how people begin to see events through the lens of “us” and “them.” Their work showed that even minimal group distinctions can generate in-group preference and out-group suspicion; in a violent setting, this tendency becomes far more dangerous.

In Manipur, the crisis has turned identity into a security boundary. A killing, arrest, rumour, checkpoint, relief measure or government statement is no longer judged only on facts. It is often judged through the question: “Is this against my community or in favour of the other?” This is the psychological moment where horizontal mistrust becomes self-reinforcing.

The tragedy is that people who once shared markets, schools, roads, workplaces and friendships can begin to see one another as representatives of collective threat. At that stage, individual guilt disappears behind collective suspicion. Conflict theory calls this the hardening of group boundaries.

3. Security dilemma: every group’s self-defence frightens the other

The ethnic security dilemma is one of the most powerful explanations for Manipur today. Lake and Rothchild argue that intense ethnic conflict is not caused simply by “ancient hatred”; it is often produced by collective fear of the future, especially when groups doubt whether the state can credibly protect them. When the state’s authority weakens or is seen as biased, communities begin preparing for their own defence; those preparations then look threatening to the other side, causing a spiral.

This is visible in Manipur’s armed village-defence atmosphere, buffer zones, checkpoints, displacement camps, segregated settlements, and fear of crossing into the “other” area. Reuters reported that weapons were in circulation, including arms stolen from police or smuggled from Myanmar, while many Kukis and Meiteis moved out of mixed areas.

The security dilemma works like this:

One side says: “We are arming or blocking roads only to protect ourselves.”

The other side hears: “They are preparing to attack us.”

The state intervenes: one group sees protection, another sees bias.

Result: fear grows even when both sides claim they want safety.

Thus, Manipur’s crisis has moved from grievance to fear, and from fear to separation.

4. Vertical mistrust: the crisis of state legitimacy

Conflict theory also asks: who controls institutions, and do people see those institutions as neutral? In Manipur, vertical mistrust has become central. Many citizens no longer evaluate the state only by laws written on paper; they evaluate it by lived experience: Who came when we were attacked? Whose FIR was registered? Whose dead were honoured? Whose displaced families were heard? Whose roads were opened? Whose suffering was ignored?

The Supreme Court’s intervention itself shows the gravity of the institutional-trust problem. In its [Manipur violence order], the Court stressed the need to restore faith and confidence in the justice system, ensure that perpetrators are punished according to law, and sustain public confidence in investigation and prosecution. It also constituted a three-judge committee led by Justice Gita Mittal for relief, rehabilitation and survivor support, and appointed an outside police officer to supervise investigations.

This matters theoretically because when citizens lose confidence in institutions, they seek security from community organisations, armed volunteers, pressure groups, ethnic councils, rumour networks and local defence structures. The state then loses its monopoly over trust, even if it still has formal authority.

In simple terms: a government may control territory, but it cannot produce peace unless people believe it is fair.

5. Cultural violence: when language makes violence acceptable

Johan Galtung’s theory divides violence into direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence. Direct violence is visible: killings, arson, sexual violence, displacement, attacks. Structural violence is built into unequal systems. Cultural violence is the language, symbols, stereotypes and narratives that make direct or structural violence appear acceptable.

In Manipur, cultural violence appears when entire communities are reduced to labels: “illegal,” “terrorist,” “drug-linked,” “land-grabber,” “anti-national,” “aggressor,” or “enemy.” Once such language spreads, the crime of an individual is transferred onto a whole community. This is how collective blame is manufactured.

The theoretical danger is that cultural violence does not always look like violence. It may look like a slogan, a speech, a rumour, a meme, a funeral speech, a protest placard, or a social-media post. But it prepares the mind to accept cruelty.

6. Conflict entrepreneurs: those who benefit from division

Conflict theory also pays attention to actors who gain from instability. These may include extremist groups, armed networks, political hardliners, black-market actors, rumour-spreaders, and leaders who gain influence by presenting themselves as sole protectors of a community.

Lake and Rothchild note that [ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs] can build upon insecurity and polarise society. In Manipur, this means the conflict is not sustained only by spontaneous anger. It is also sustained by networks that turn fear into mobilisation, mobilisation into power, and power into bargaining strength.

This is why peace is difficult: for ordinary people, peace means returning home; for conflict entrepreneurs, peace may mean losing relevance.

7. Displacement and segregation: mistrust becomes geography

Displacement changes conflict from an event into a living structure. Once people are separated into camps, protected zones and community-specific territories, mistrust becomes geographical. ACLED’s description of near-complete segregation is therefore not only a demographic fact; it is a conflict-theory warning. Separation reduces everyday contact, and reduced contact allows rumours to replace relationships.

Intergroup Contact Theory, associated with Gordon Allport and later work by Pettigrew, suggests that contact reduces prejudice best when there is equal status, common goals, cooperation and authority support. But unsafe, unequal or forced contact can deepen fear. Therefore, simply telling communities to “live together again” is not enough. They need conditions where coexistence is safe, dignified and institutionally protected.

The Manipur crisis in one theoretical formula

Structural insecurity + identity fear + weak institutional trust + armed separation + hostile narratives = prolonged ethnic conflict.

Or more simply:

Vertical mistrust makes people doubt the state. Horizontal mistrust makes people fear neighbours. Together, they create a society where every action is suspected, every rumour travels fast, and every tragedy can become another trigger.

What conflict theory teaches for Manipur

The first lesson is that policing alone cannot solve a conflict that has become structural and psychological. Security is necessary, but security without trust can be read as occupation, bias or threat.

The second lesson is that justice must be both real and visible. The Supreme Court’s emphasis on restoring public confidence in investigation and prosecution is crucial because, in a mistrust society, justice hidden from public confidence will not heal public wounds.

The third lesson is that peace must operate at three levels: stop direct violence, correct structural grievances, and defeat cultural hatred. Galtung’s framework makes clear that removing guns is only the beginning; societies must also remove the narratives and inequalities that make violence return.

Final theoretical framing

Manipur today is best understood as a crisis of mutual insecurity. The Meitei fear loss of identity, land security, demographic balance and historical centrality. The Kuki-Zo fear loss of land, autonomy, physical safety and equal protection. Other communities fear being dragged into a binary conflict that may erase their own concerns. The government faces a legitimacy deficit because different communities judge its actions through different wounds. Therefore, the problem is not only that communities disagree. The deeper problem is that they no longer trust the same facts, the same institutions, or the same future.

The crisis began with events. It now survives through structures. It will end only when Manipur rebuilds both: vertical trust in the state and horizontal trust among communities.

(Sheikh Abdul Hakim is Director, Social Welfare, Government of Manipur)

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Manipur Crisis Through Conflict Theory: A Two-Level Mistrust Model

The post Manipur Crisis Through Conflict Theory: A Two-Level Mistrust Model first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

By Sheikh Abdul Hakim

Core thesis

1. Structural conflict: unequal power, land, representation and resources

2. Identity conflict: when grievance becomes community consciousness

3. Security dilemma: every group’s self-defence frightens the other

The security dilemma works like this:

One side says: “We are arming or blocking roads only to protect ourselves.”

The other side hears: “They are preparing to attack us.”

The state intervenes: one group sees protection, another sees bias.

Result: fear grows even when both sides claim they want safety.

Thus, Manipur’s crisis has moved from grievance to fear, and from fear to separation.

4. Vertical mistrust: the crisis of state legitimacy

In simple terms: a government may control territory, but it cannot produce peace unless people believe it is fair.

5. Cultural violence: when language makes violence acceptable

6. Conflict entrepreneurs: those who benefit from division

This is why peace is difficult: for ordinary people, peace means returning home; for conflict entrepreneurs, peace may mean losing relevance.

7. Displacement and segregation: mistrust becomes geography

The Manipur crisis in one theoretical formula

Structural insecurity + identity fear + weak institutional trust + armed separation + hostile narratives = prolonged ethnic conflict.

Or more simply:

What conflict theory teaches for Manipur

Final theoretical framing

The crisis began with events. It now survives through structures. It will end only when Manipur rebuilds both: vertical trust in the state and horizontal trust among communities.

(Sheikh Abdul Hakim is Director, Social Welfare, Government of Manipur)

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Manipur: Class 12 Results 2026 Declared: Pass Percentage at 92.23%

Details of the Result at the end of the brief report

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Officials attributed the marginal decline in pass percentage to the ongoing challenges in the state since 2023 but maintained that the results were commendable given the circumstances. Commissioner Geoffrey said strict monitoring and a controlled examination environment ensured fairness.

TFM Report

Council of Higher Secondary Education Manipur (COHSEM) on Monday announced the Class 12 examination results for 2026, with an overall pass percentage of 92.23%, reflecting a slight dip from last year’s 94%.

The results were declared in Imphal in the presence of senior officials, including Education (Schools) Commissioner Ningthoujam Geoffrey and COHSEM Chairman T Ojit Singh.

A total of 31,259 students appeared for the examinations held from February 17 to March 20, with one subject re-exam conducted on April 1. Of these, 28,829 students passed, including 14,165 in first division, 12,879 in second division, and 1,763 in third division.

“We cannot compare with previous years due to the very typical situation since 2023. Despite the challenges, the results are quite good,” he noted.

Stream-wise Toppers

In the Science stream, Takhellambam Kalpana Devi (COMET School, Changangei) and Yohen Longjam (Comprehensive Concept School, Sangaiprou) jointly topped with 490 marks.

In Arts, Sarangthem Ayingbi Chanu of Enlighten Knowledge Higher Secondary School secured the top position with 470 marks, followed by Pushpa Kakchingtabam of TG Higher Secondary School with 456 marks.

In Commerce, Thoihenba Thongam from CC Higher Secondary School topped with 454 marks, while Haorongbam Keniya Chanu of TG Higher Secondary School secured second position with 433 marks.

District-wise and Gender Performance:

Among districts, Noney district recorded the highest pass percentage at 98.93%, followed by Thoubal district at 97.65%. Jiribam district recorded the lowest at 80.08%.

Girls once again outperformed boys across both government and private institutions. Government schools recorded a pass rate of 86.91%, while private schools performed better with 94.54%.

Despite the slight decline, authorities highlighted the smooth conduct of examinations and timely declaration of results as a significant achievement under difficult circumstances.

Details Here: Science_WallSheet Science_Topper HighestMarkPrint District Wise Institute wise pass Percentage District wise govt _Non_govt Pass percentage Commerce_WallSheet Commerce_Topper Arts_WallSheet Arts_Topper Subject wise Pass Percentage

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American Export of Death: How US Regulatory Failure Created India’s ‘Zombie’ Crisis

The spread of “Zombie Drugs” is a mirror reflecting the global harm of the American opioid crisis. The US cannot manufacture drug domestically while waving the tariff stick internationally, painting India as a “drug exporter.” Therefore, the US must confront its own regulatory loopholes, strengthen customs inspections, and cut off illegal outflows of Fentanyl and […]

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By Vikram Mehta

As a chilling video goes viral across social media—showing a man standing motionless like a ‘zombie’ amidst heavy traffic, unresponsive to the world around him—panic is gripping Indian society regarding the surge of new synthetic drugs. However, Bengaluru City Police clarified that the man in the video was not under the influence of narcotics. They stated that the individual had consumed liquor and was taking prescribed medication for arthritis, a combination that explained his erratic behavior.

However, while the public eye turns inward to scrutinize domestic regulatory gaps, a suppressed truth is emerging: the “Zombie Drug” crisis currently devouring India’s youth has its roots deeply embedded in the regulatory failures of the United States.

What Is The Larger Warning Here?

According to recent investigations and medical analysis, the culprit behind the victims’ “walking dead” state is a lethal cocktail of Fentanyl and Xylazine. Known globally as “Zombie Drug,” this mixture is not an indigenous Indian product but a toxic recipe pioneered in the US that is now being replicated in India’s black markets.

In the US, Xylazine—a veterinary sedative—has long been mixed by traffickers with Fentanyl to enhance potency and prolong effects, leading to coma, skin necrosis, and death for countless Americans. Today, this “chemical nightmare,” which has ravaged American streets, is flowing back into India through illegal channels, becoming a new tumor destroying the future of Indian youth.

“This is not just an Indian problem; it is a global consequence of American regulatory failure,” G. Shreekumar Menon, former Director General of the National Academy of Customs, Excise and Narcotics (NACEN), pointed out sharply in a recent commentary. “With the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspecting only 3.7% of incoming containers annually, this extremely lax system allows Fentanyl and its precursor chemicals to flood the globe. Now, The US is attempting to export its domestic failure by scapegoating India, ignoring that the very chemicals fueling this crisis were first unleashed by American policy.

Collateral Damage?How India Became America’s Pharmaceutical Scapegoat

Ironically, it was the aggressive marketing by American pharmaceutical giants in the 1990s and early 2000s that triggered the opioid addiction explosion within the US. Companies like Purdue Pharma downplayed addiction risks, pushing potent painkillers to the masses, ultimately a tragedy claiming hundreds of thousands of American lives. Now, facing massive lawsuits and strict regulations at home, these same firms are turning their gaze toward India’s relatively lenient market.

• Market Penetration: US giants like Johnson & Johnson and Mundipharma (controlled by the Sackler family) are aggressively promoting Fentanyl patches and Buprenorphine in India under the guise of “pain relief,” effectively replicating the American addiction model here.

• Regulatory Vacuum: Although India has regulated certain opioids, the regulatory system is stretched thin against the lobbying of US pharma giants and the massive demand for pain management. A vast amount of unregulated Fentanyl precursors is flowing into the black market through legitimate trade channels, where they are processed into lethal “Zombie Drugs.”

The Trump Administration’s Strategy?Weaponization of Trade

The “Zombie Drug” phenomenon sweeping Punjab is not merely a domestic failure; it is the dark echo of an American tragedy. The lethal cocktail of Fentanyl and Xylazine—a veterinary sedative turned human poison—was perfected on American streets before finding its way into Indian veins. While Washington points fingers at New Delhi, the reality is stark: the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspects less than 4% of incoming containers, creating a porous gateway that allows precursor chemicals to flood the global market.

Now, as President Trump’s administration imposes punitive 100% tariffs on Indian pharmaceuticals under the guise of “national security,” the hypocrisy is glaring. The US is weaponizing the very crisis it helped create to strangle India’s $130 billion pharma industry. As former NACEN DG G. Shreekumar Menon warned, “Fighting Fentanyl with tariffs is fighting the wrong war.” The true battle is not against Indian exporters, but against the regulatory vacuum and corporate greed that turned America’s opioid epidemic into a global export.

India Draws the Line: Gen Z Will Not Be Held Hostage to America’s Drug Catastrophe

• Anti-Drug Politicians Speak Out: The “War on Drugs” led by Punjab Chief Minister Bhagwant Mann and former Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal is penetrating the streets. They argue that anti-drug efforts cannot rely solely on domestic enforcement; the source of drugs from the US must be cut off.

• Expert Calls: Think tanks like the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) point out that the US “weaponizing” Fentanyl and unilaterally imposing tariffs does nothing to solve the crisis. Instead, it exacerbates global supply chain chaos, making Indian youth the collateral damage of geopolitical games.

Face the Root Cause, Reject the Scapegoat

India Calls for:

1. The US must confront its own regulatory loopholes, strengthen customs inspections, and cut off illegal outflows of Fentanyl and its precursors.

2. Stop the politicization and weaponization of the Fentanyl issue. Cancel discriminatory tariffs on Indian pharmaceuticals and jointly combat transnational drug trafficking networks.

3. Strengthen international cooperation to establish a transparent tracking mechanism for precursor chemicals, rather than engaging in unilateral accusations.

It is time for India to demand accountability from Washington, not just from its own streets. Indian youth should not become the sacrificial lambs for American pharmaceutical greed and regulatory failure. Only by facing the true root of the crisis can we save the lives of those struggling in a “zombie” state.

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Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part III – Impact & Implementation Challenges

Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part III – Impact & Implementation Challenges By Lt Col Ujjual Abhishek Jha, Retd The enactment of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 marks a seismic shift in India’s legislative approach to privacy and simultaneously introduces a complex web of operational demands for businesses. From […]

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Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part III – Impact & Implementation Challenges

By Lt Col Ujjual Abhishek Jha, Retd

The enactment of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 marks a seismic shift in India’s legislative approach to privacy and simultaneously introduces a complex web of operational demands for businesses. From re-engineering legacy data systems to navigating the nuances of “Data Fiduciaries” and “Significant Data Fiduciaries,” the road to compliance is paved with both technical hurdles and strategic questions. In this part of our series, we dive into the tangible impact of the DPDPA and the primary challenges organizations face in turning these legal mandates into functional realities.

DPDPA: Enforcement Timeline

The DPDPA applies exclusively to digital personal data, data collected digitally or subsequently digitised, processed in India, or outside India in connection with offering goods or services to individuals in India.

Impact & Challenges

• Impact on Individuals (Data Principals)
DPDPA strengthens individual control over personal data, translating the constitutional right to privacy into enforceable statutory rights. Data principals rights include: –
• Right to Access – obtain a summary of personal data held and processing activities though notably without a data portability right.
• Right to Correction and Erasure – request rectification of inaccurate data or deletion of data no longer required.
• Right to Withdraw Consent – revoke consent at any time, data fiduciaries must respond within 90 days.
• Right to Nominate – appoint a nominee to exercise rights in case of incapacitation or death.
• Right to Grievance Redressal – exhaustion of internal mechanism required for complaint be lodged with the DPBI.
• Children under 18: heightened protection – verifiable parental/guardian consent is mandatory before processing a minor’s data, with specific exemptions carved out for healthcare professionals, educational institutions and child transport providers. Penalty up to Rs 200 crores.

Implementation Challenges for Individuals
• Literacy and Awareness Gap – India’s low digital literacy users may not be able to practically exercise rights, file complaints or interpret consent notices. The notice requirement specifies English and all 22 Scheduled languages, creating a multilingual compliance obligation, which remains a challenge.
• Dark Patterns and Consent Quality – While the DPDPA prohibits conditional consent and pre-ticked boxes, enforcement against confusing consent flows or hidden opt-outs, will depend heavily on DPBI capacity and proactive complaint filing.
• Grievance Exhaustion Requirement – Data principals must exhaust the data fiduciary’s internal grievance mechanism before approaching the DPBI. The 90-day response window, while clear, could be exploited as a delay mechanism by less scrupulous operators.
• RTI Act Amendment: Right to Know vs Right to Privacy – One of the most consequential changes brought by the DPDPA is the amendment to Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. The original provision allowed disclosure of personal data held by public authorities in the ‘larger public interest’. The DPDPA removes this override, significantly curtailing the ability of citizens and journalists to access personal data held by government bodies.

Impact on MSMEs and Small Businesses
• Scope of Compliance Obligations – MSMEs that process digital personal data with customer-facing digital touchpoints, employee HR systems or supplier databases, are subject to the DPDPA. The aspects include, consent, notice requirements, purpose limitation, data minimisation, reasonable security safeguards, breach notification (72-hour deadline), data principal rights handling and contractual obligations with data processors. The Act offers no blanket small-business exemption.
• Sector-Specific Heightened Risk – Most MSMEs will not be classified as Significant Data Fiduciaries, avoiding the DPO and DPIA obligations. However, volume-driven or sector-specific designation is possible for Fintech and lending platforms processing KYC and financial data, Healthtech and telemedicine platforms with patient records, Edtech platforms with children’s data, SaaS and E-commerce.
• Compliance Cost and Capacity Challenges
• Budget and Resource Constraints – Legal, technical and organisational costs may range from ?5–25 lakh for a simple MSME to ?50 lakh or more for data-heavy verticals, costs that can be existentially challenging for businesses in early stages.
• Legacy Systems and Data Mapping – Many MSMEs operate on basic ERP systems, Excel-based databases, or fragmented CRMs that lack built-in consent tracking, automated data deletion workflows, or audit logging capabilities. Mapping all personal data flows including through informal channels such as WhatsApp Business, ad-tech trackers, and offline data later digitised to meet documentation requirements is technically complex without dedicated resources.
• Awareness Gap – Awareness of DPDPA obligations among MSME operators remains low and without targeted government outreach programmes, many small businesses risk inadvertent non-compliance.
• 72-Hour Breach Notification – The 72-hour window to notify the DPBI and affected data principals of a personal data breach demands 24/7 incident monitoring infrastructure that most MSMEs lack.

Impact on Large Corporates and Conglomerates

For large enterprises, the DPDPA drives a fundamental shift toward institutionalised privacy governance and requires a privacy-by-design approach. Key enterprise-level requirements include enterprise privacy policies and data governance frameworks, role-based access controls and privileged access management, vendor and third-party data processing agreements with mandatory DPDPA compliance clauses, accountability through privacy registers, audit trails and board-level oversight and automated data lifecycle management.

Significant Data Fiduciary Obligations – Large enterprises across sectors are likely to be designated as SDFs which entails appointment of an India based DPO, annual Data Protection Impact Assessments, annual independent audits, algorithmic risk verification and potential data localisation mandates for government-specified data categories.
Implementation Challenges for Large Corporates and Conglomerates

• Legacy System Modernisation – India’s large corporate landscape runs on legacy architectures that lack support for consent tracking, automated erasure or granular access logging.
• Multi-Regulator Complexity (BFSI) – They will have dual-compliance challenge meeting RBI, SEBI, IRDAI and NPCI requirements and reconciling KYC data processing under DPDPA’s consent and purpose-limitation principles requirement.
• DPO Scarcity – The requirement of DPO creates a talent supply crisis with India has fewer than 5,000 practitioners with certifications.
• AI and Algorithmic Compliance – The requirement for algorithmic risk verification introduces compliance overhead at the model design, training and deployment stages and may require significant architectural changes.

Impact on International Business
• Extraterritorial Reach – The DPDPA applies to any entity Indian or foreign that processes personal data of individuals located in India in connection with offering goods or services to those individuals. Foreign entities without an India office but serving Indian users through e-commerce, SaaS, mobile apps or digital services must comply with the full DPDPA regime, including responding to DPBI enforcement.
• Cross-Border Data Transfers: The Negative List – DPDPA establish a ‘negative list’ approach to cross-border transfers, personal data may be transferred to any country except those specifically restricted by the Central Government notification. However, it introduces a distinctive set of challenges, as no published criteria of blacklisted countries, No advance notice requirements for Blacklisting, No standard contractual clauses and persistence of sector specific laws.
• Compliance Cost – Multinational companies face layered compliance costs of updating global privacy policies for Indian requirements, implementing multilingual consent notices, deploying India-specific consent management infrastructure, renegotiating data processing agreements with India-based processors and sub-processors, and maintaining the technical capability to respond to DPBI enforcement actions.

Impact on Government and Law Enforcement Agencies
Government as Data Fiduciary – Government entities are ‘data fiduciaries’ under the DPDPA when processing citizens’ digital personal data and subject to the same baseline obligations as private sector entities. However, Section 17 of the DPDPA provides exemptions for State processing for sovereignty, integrity, security, public order, and prevention/investigation of offences, research, archiving or statistical purposes, Legal and judicial proceedings and Processing of non-residents personal data within India.
Law Enforcement and Investigation Challenges – Law enforcement agencies face a contradiction, as data fiduciaries must comply with DPDPA and mandated for exemptions. This creates operational complexity as legacy systems holding this data still require security safeguards.

Judicial Implications
• Appellate Jurisdiction Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) – TDSAT is designated as the appellate body for DPBI decisions, is primarily a telecommunications regulator with limited data privacy jurisprudence.
• No Criminal Penalties – This reduces the risk of regulatory overreach against individuals but may limit deterrence effectiveness for misuse by corporate actors who can absorb financial penalties as a cost of business.
• Interpretation Challenges – Courts and the DPBI will face interpretive questions as What constitutes ‘reasonable security safeguards’, How Puttaswamy judgement applies to the government exemptions and interplay between DPDPA and sector-specific regulations where conflicts arise.

DPDPA 2023 is more than just a compliance checklist and is a catalyst for a fundamental cultural shift in how data is perceived. While the implementation challenges are significant, they are implementable. Organizations that view these hurdles as an opportunity to build ‘Privacy by Design’ will likely find themselves with a competitive edge in an increasingly data-conscious global market.

For Part I – Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part I — The Foundations of Privacy: Evolution of Indian Laws & A Roadmap to DPDPA – The Frontier Manipur
For Part II – Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA) 2023 Series: Part II — From Principles to Practice: The DPDP Rules 2025, Global Paradigms & India’s Middle Path – The Frontier Manipur

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INNOCENT BLOODS SHED: Rocket Attack Kills Two Children & Severely Injures Mother, Imphal Valley Seized By Massive Tension

Fresh Horror Struck Tronglaobi in Bishnupur District as Suspected Militant Strike Turns a Home into a Living Grave. TFM Report The Imphal Valley, particularly Bishnupur District, has been gripped by tension and rising public anger since early morning Tuesday (April 7, 2026), after the news of the killing of two children and their mother […]

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Fresh Horror Struck Tronglaobi in Bishnupur District as Suspected Militant Strike Turns a Home into a Living Grave.

TFM Report

The Imphal Valley, particularly Bishnupur District, has been gripped by tension and rising public anger since early morning Tuesday (April 7, 2026), after the news of the killing of two children and their mother in an improvised rocket/pompi attack.

According to sources, suspected Kuki militants launched a projectile—believed to be a rocket—targeting a civilian residence in Moirang Tronglaobi village. The explosive struck the house directly through a window, triggering a powerful blast that killed two young siblings and left their mother seriously injured.

Siblings Aged 5 Years and 5 Months Killed

The victims have been identified as a five-year-old boy, his five-month-old sister and their mother who later succumbed to injuries, as per sources from the locality. The explosion caused significant damage to the house and sent shockwaves across Imphal valley, with village residents rushing to the scene in an attempt to rescue the injured.

*The children struck by the splinters of from the rocket blast being ruched to a nearby hospital. Source: Social Media*

Locals claimed the projectile was fired from nearby hill slopes, suggesting that the launch point was located more than three kilometres away. Tronglaobi lies along the vulnerable hill-valley fringe near Moirang in Bishnupur district, close to the elevated areas of Churachandpur district, a region that has witnessed repeated tensions in since May 3, 2023.

Fury Spills into Streets – Police Station Gate Torched by Irate Mob

By post-dawn, irate mobs converged at the Moirang Police Station and burnt down the gate, as anger over the deaths of the two children boiled over. Reports are emerging that the incident is likely to trigger widespread protest and subsequent reactions across the valley, raising fears of a fresh spiral of violence.

Security Tightened – Forces Deployed Along Hill-Valley Boundary

As expected, security has been significantly tightened across the area following the attack, an act considered too late by the public. Additional forces have been deployed to prevent further escalation, while surveillance and search operations are underway in adjoining hill regions. Authorities are also closely monitoring other sensitive villages along the hill-valley boundary to avert any further incidents, said a source.

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INNOCENT BLOODS SHED: Rocket Attack Kills Two Children & Severely Injures Mother, Imphal Valley Seized By Massive Tension

The post INNOCENT BLOODS SHED: Rocket Attack Kills Two Children & Severely Injures Mother, Imphal Valley Seized By Massive Tension first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

Fresh Horror Struck Tronglaobi in Bishnupur District as Suspected Militant Strike Turns a Home into a Living Grave.

TFM Report

Siblings Aged 5 Years and 5 Months Killed

Fury Spills into Streets – Police Station Gate Torched by Irate Mob

Security Tightened – Forces Deployed Along Hill-Valley Boundary

The post INNOCENT BLOODS SHED: Rocket Attack Kills Two Children & Severely Injures Mother, Imphal Valley Seized By Massive Tension first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

INNOCENT BLOODS SHED: Rocket Attack Kills Two Children & Severely Injures Mother, Imphal Valley Seized By Massive Tension

The post INNOCENT BLOODS SHED: Rocket Attack Kills Two Children & Severely Injures Mother, Imphal Valley Seized By Massive Tension first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

Fresh Horror Struck Tronglaobi in Bishnupur District as Suspected Militant Strike Turns a Home into a Living Grave.

TFM Report

Siblings Aged 5 Years and 5 Months Killed

Fury Spills into Streets – Police Station Gate Torched by Irate Mob

Security Tightened – Forces Deployed Along Hill-Valley Boundary

The post INNOCENT BLOODS SHED: Rocket Attack Kills Two Children & Severely Injures Mother, Imphal Valley Seized By Massive Tension first appeared on The Frontier Manipur.

India Commits to Stronger Climate Action with NDC 3.0

India reinforces global climate stance with calibrated targets aligned to Viksit Bharat 2047 vision. Cabinet clears updated climate commitments aiming 60% non-fossil power capacity and expanded carbon sinks by 2035. New framework balances development needs with decarbonisation amid West Asia conflict and energy security concerns By Salam Rajesh The Government of India recently took a […]

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By Salam Rajesh

The Government of India recently took a significant step forward in its climate commitments with the Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, approving the country’s updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

Analysts say although delayed, the third institution of the NDCs comes at a time when the global supply chains and energy security have been severely disrupted owing to the conflict in West Asia.

India’s NDC 3.0 builds on a strong track record, where earlier the country had enhanced its Nationally Determined Contributions and met key targets well ahead of schedule, including achieving over 50% non-fossil power capacity nearly five years before the 2030 deadline.

A Press Information Bureau (PIB) release said the new NDC framework sets out a roadmap for the target years 2033-2035, anchored in the principles of the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR-RC) and the vision of Viksit Bharat 2047.

The framework targets a 47% reduction in emission intensity, expansion of non-fossil power capacity to 60%, and a significant increase in carbon sinks up to 4 billion tons, the PIB report said.

India’s Central Electricity Authority estimates in the National Power Adequacy Plan that by 2035-36, nearly 70% of electricity capacity will come from non-fossil sources. However, its formal commitment as approved under NDC 3.0 under the UN framework sets a lower target of 60%.

Similarly, India’s target of reducing emission intensity to 47% by 2035 reflects a calibrated approach, the release said noting that as a fast-growing and emerging economy, India’s intensity-based target balances development needs with climate ambition.

In the current geopolitical context of supply chain disruptions and energy security concerns, this target provides flexibility while remaining aligned with its broader aspirational goals and long-term net-zero pathway.

The announcement comes amid an ongoing conflict in West Asia, which has disrupted energy supply chains and has highlighted risks of the global economy’s dependence on fossil fuels.

In this context, India’s demonstrated stance on decarbonizing its energy and transport systems signals continuity. The country, which had met its past climate commitments ahead of schedule, also holds the BRICS chair this year. The commitments announced raise expectations of a BRICS-led focus on de-risking supply chains through decarbonisation under India’s presidency, the PIB release noted.

The strategy underpinned by India has emphasized climate-resilient infrastructure, green industrial pathways, behavioral shifts and the development of low-cost green finance and advanced research and development ecosystems, reflecting an economy-wide approach to deep decarbonisation, it said.

This assessment comes in terms of the country’s achievement in 36% reduction in emission intensity of GDP achieved between 2005-2020, where 52.57% of India’s power generation capacity is from clean, non-fossil sources and was achieved 5 years ahead of the 2030 schedule.

2.3 billion tons of carbon sink was created through forests and trees, indicating India’s NDC submitted in 2015 had the target of achieving 33 to 35% reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP and 40% share of non-fossil resources based electric power installed capacity by 2030, both of which were met, 11 years and 9 years ahead of the committed timelines respectively, the PIB statement said.

Outlining the vision for NDC 3.0, the government press statement said the qualitative goals are intended to embed sustainability into everyday life and governance systems, promote climate-resilient development pathways, and enable a just and inclusive transition for all sections of the society.

Eight major goals for 2033-2035, aligned with CBDR-RC and Viksit Bharat 2047, were announced. These include Goal 1: Target reduction of emission intensity to 47% by 2035, Goal 2: Achieve 60% of cumulative installed electricity capacity non-fossil power capacity by 2035.

Goal 3 seeks increase in carbon sink from 2.3 billion tons to 3.5-4.0 billion tons through tree and plantation cover, while Goal 4 targets climate-friendly and cleaner path of economic development, citing the example of the ongoing investments in electrification of the Railways.

Goal 5 looks at the resilient infrastructure to combat climate change effects like sudden rain and cloud bursts, while Goal 6 seeks in promoting the Prime Minister’s ‘Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE)’ mission.

Goal 7 looks at developing low-cost, long-term finance mechanisms for green energy, and Goal 8 seeks capacity building and research and development, with focus on cutting edge technology and international collaborations.

Lauri Myllyvirta, Lead Analyst and Co-Founder, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, reflects that India’s new 2035 climate targets underestimate the country’s potential for transformative clean energy growth.

Under current plans, the target of 60% clean power capacity will be achieved before 2030, rather than by 2035, Lauri reflected, noting that continuing the current clean energy growth at rates already achieved in 2024-25 would enable India to peak power sector emissions well before 2030 and significantly slow down its CO2 emission growth rates.

Yet, the carbon intensity target announced allows for an acceleration of emissions growth compared with past rates if GDP growth is at target. India’s booming clean energy industry is highly likely to deliver much faster progress than policymakers were prepared to commit to, she said.

Deliberating on the issue, Aarti Khosla, Director, Climate Trends noted that India’s updated NDC targets reflect a realistic yet forward-looking climate strategy, especially coming at a time when the global order is fractured and the future of energy policy is very uncertain.

Releasing the NDC at this juncture reinforces that as a country India respects multilateralism and equity, both aspects found wanting in the world today, she noted.

A 47% reduction in emission intensity by 2035, alongside achieving 60% non-fossil capacity, signals continuity in ambition while remaining grounded in domestic, developmental and geopolitical realities.

The fact that India has already crossed 50% non-fossil capacity underscores the credibility of this trajectory, and equally important is the expansion of carbon sinks, which reinforces the country’s commitment to nature-based solutions, Aarti emphasized.

In a global context where attention is increasingly shifting toward energy security and climate finance flows are under strain, India’s approach stands out for its balance. It prioritizes domestic capability, resilience, and long-term sustainability while continuing to advance its climate commitments, a positive sign for the entire global south and the BRICS, especially with India chairing the grouping annual meet this year, she observed.

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